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 RESOURCE ALLOCATION AS AN OUTCROPPING
 OF STRATEGIC CONSISTENCY:
 PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS
 JEFFREY S. HARRISON
 University of Central Florida
 ERNEST H. HALL, JR.
 University of Southern Indiana
 RAJENDRA NARGUNDKAR
 Vignana Jyothi Institute of Management
 Similarities in financial resource allocations across the lines of busi-
 ness of diversified firms may indicate corporate strategic consistency,
 which may lead to superior corporate performance. In support of this
 argument, the variance in R&D intensity across the lines of business of
 96 diversified firms was found to be inversely related to industry-
 adjusted return on assets. However, no relationship was found for cap-
 ital intensity. These results provide partial support for the usefulness of
 a resource-based approach to the study of diversification strategy.
 The increase in the diversification of business organizations in the
 United States and elsewhere over the past several decades has been accom-
 panied by an increase in research on the topic. Hoskisson and Hitt (1990)
 included 254 citations in their review of the diversification literature (cf.
 Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). Although much of this research has cen-
 tered on the relationship between diversification and financial performance,
 contradictory findings have made it difficult for researchers to agree on
 which of many alternative theories best represents this critical relationship
 (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). Of particular concern is the role of relatedness
 among a firm's diversified businesses in producing synergy and thus higher
 performance.
 The purpose of this article is to present theory and empirical evidence
 that support a resource-based view of the relationship between diversifica-
 tion and performance (Barney, 1988; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland,
 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1984). The resource-based
 view, which focuses on the management of firm resources to produce a
 sustainable competitive advantage, is in harmony with some of the tradi-
 We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Department of Management at Clemson
 University, where most of this research was conducted. We would also like to thank Michael
 Stahl, Caron St. John, Stephen Cantrell, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal; their
 advice greatly enhanced the quality of this project and the final article.
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 tional diversification literature. However, it also provides unique perspec-
 tives on the relatedness-performance relationship. We developed these per-
 spectives and tested some resulting hypotheses. In particular, our hypothe-
 ses concern the performance effects of resource allocation similarities among
 the lines of business of large, diversified firms over a seven-year period.
 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
 The traditional product-market approach to conceptualizing and mea-
 suring diversification has limitations. We offer an alternative approach stem-
 ming from the resource-based view of firms.
 Traditional Perspectives on Diversification
 Many management scholars believe that relatedness among the lines of
 business of diversified firms results in higher performance (e.g., Bettis, 1981;
 Bettis & Mahajan, 1985; Capon, Hulbert, Farley, & Martin, 1988; Davis, Rob-
 inson, Pearce, & Park, 1992; Lubatkin & Rogers, 1989; Rumelt, 1974, 1982;
 Shelton, 1988; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987; Wernerfelt & Montgomery,
 1986). However, researchers have reported both results that support that
 idea and results that do not (e.g., Amit & Livnat, 1988; Bettis & Hall, 1982;
 Dubofsky & Varadarajan, 1987; Grant & Jammine, 1988; Grant, Jammine, &
 Thomas, 1988; Michel & Shaked, 1984; Palepu, 1985). These discrepancies
 are sometimes traceable to the influence of differing perspectives and meth-
 odologies (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Montgomery, 1979; Venkatraman, 1989).
 A closer examination of widely used measures of relatedness and supporting
 theoretical explanations will help bring these issues to light.
 Most empirical studies of the relatedness construct have made use of
 output-based measures that rely on product, market, or technological simi-
 larities within a diversified firm's business portfolio (e.g., Capon et al., 1988;
 Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Nathanson & Cassano, 1982; Palepu, 1985;
 Rumelt, 1974, 1982; Shelton, 1988; Simmonds, 1990; Varadarajan & Ra-
 manujam, 1987). For example, in one of the most frequently cited studies,
 Rumelt defined lines of business as related if they were "tangibly related to
 the collective skills and strengths possessed originally by the firm" (1974:
 11). He observed three types of relatedness: "(1) relationships among mar-
 kets served and distribution systems; (2) relationships based on similar pro-
 duction technologies; or (3) the exploitation of science-based research"
 (Rumelt, 1974: 17).
 In another widely cited study, Palepu (1985) employed the Jacquemin
 and Berry (1979) entropy measure, which is based on the Standard Industrial
 Classification (SIC) system created by the United States Department of Com-
 merce. SIC codes are based on traditional industry groupings in the U.S.
 economy. For example, the two-digit "major group 33" is used to identify
 businesses that are engaged in primary metal industries. The major group is
 then divided into three-digit groups such as blast furnaces (331), iron and
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 steel foundries (332), and primary metal industries (333). These groups are
 then divided into more specific four-digit industries such as copper (3331)
 and lead (3332). According to Jacquemin and Berry (1979), businesses are
 related if they are involved in different four-digit industries within the same
 major two-digit group.
 In theory, similarities among products, markets, or technologies, as
 identified with measures such as those described above, should lead to
 synergies, often through economies of scope (Panzer & Willig, 1981; Rumelt,
 1982; Teece, 1980). Synergies can arise from tangible similarities among
 businesses that allow the combining of physical processes, such as use of the
 same marketing channels for several related products or use of excess pro-
 duction capacity to produce an additional product. Synergies may also arise
 from intangible resource commonalities that result in an ability to share
 management expertise or know-how across several related business seg-
 ments (Porter, 1985, 1987).
 Although output-based approaches to the measurement of relatedness
 are often considered valid indicators for the potential for resource-based
 synergies, these synergies may never be realized (Nayyar, 1992), which may
 partially explain the contradictions noted earlier. One reason for this loss of
 potential could be that some related diversification strategies are well for-
 mulated but inappropriately implemented. For example, Hill, Hitt, and
 Hoskisson (1992) discovered that high performance in related-diversified
 firms is partially dependent on high centralization of control, high integra-
 tion of activities, use of both subjective and objective criteria in evaluating
 divisional performance, and incentive schemes that are linked to the prof-
 itability of an entire corporation.
 Another reason companies may not realize synergies is that the poten-
 tial for synergies based on intangible resources relies on assumptions that
 business units producing similar products or marketing goods to similar
 customers use similar management techniques or share a strategic focus.
 These assumptions may not always be valid. For example, it is possible for
 two companies to produce the same product but have very different per-
 spectives on the usefulness of research and development in the way it is
 produced (Porter, 1985). In addition, the same two companies may have
 dissimilar capital structures, with one company favoring human labor and
 customization while the other emphasizes a more highly automated produc-
 tion process and standardization. This type of diversity is common in in-
 dustries such as steel and automobiles.
 A resource-based view of diversification can overcome some of the lim-
 itations associated with traditional product- or market-based diversification
 theory and research (Harrison et al., 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wern-
 erfelt, 1984). From a resource-based perspective, the management of firm
 resources is closely linked to both strategy formulation and strategy imple-
 mentation, but the use of traditional measures encourages a focus on strategy
 formulation only. In addition, similar levels of investment in resources such
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 as R&D and capital across the lines of business of a diversified firm could be
 a sign of consistency in dominant logic, distinctive competency, or other
 organizational factors.
 A Resource-based Perspective on Diversification
 From a resource-based view, business executives should manage diver-
 sified resources so as to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage (Bar-
 ney, 1991), which should lead to short- and long-term economic profits
 (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). Barney classified firm resources into three
 types: physical (Williamson, 1975), human (Becker, 1964), and organization-
 al (Tomer, 1987). Most closely related to the present study's concerns are (1)
 human resources, organizational elements such as the training, experience,
 judgment, intelligence, and insight of a firm's managers, and (2) organiza-
 tional resources, which include the firm's formal and informal planning,
 controlling, and coordinating systems and its formal reporting structure.
 According to Mahoney and Pandian, unique capabilities arising from
 technical know-how and managerial ability "are important sources of het-
 erogeneity that may result in sustained competitive advantage" (1992: 365).
 Distinctive competence and superior organizational routines may enable a
 firm to generate profits (e.g., economic rents) from a resource advantage
 (Hitt & Ireland, 1985; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). Citing Penrose (1959),
 Mahoney and Pandian continued, "A firm may achieve rents not because it
 has better resources, but rather the firm's distinctive competence involves
 making better use of its resources" (1992: 365)."
 Harrison and colleagues (1991) recently investigated the issue of wheth-
 er resource allocation similarities or differences between acquiring firms and
 their targets are associated with better management of combined resources in
 post-merger periods. Specifically, they compared acquiring and target firm
 premerger expenditure levels in key strategic areas such as R&D. Surpris-
 ingly, they discovered that differences, not similarities, in expenditure lev-
 els were associated with higher financial performance. They explained that
 their findings were primarily a result of the competitive bidding process for
 acquisitions, which tends to result in acquiring firms' paying higher premi-
 ums when they are strategically similar to their targets (Barney, 1986, 1988).
 Although the bidding process argument applies well to acquisitions, it
 is not compelling in the case of a firm with an established portfolio of
 businesses. One reason for the discrepancy is that a lot of diversification
 occurs through internal development (Porter, 1987), where the external bid-
 ding process does not apply. Also, even in the case of acquisitions, the
 short-term effects and high costs, such as premiums, attorney and advise-
 ment fees, and transaction costs, are likely to be dissipated over the long
 term, especially as the operations of the acquired firm are integrated into its
 parent.
 Harrison and colleagues (1991) also explained that acquiring firms may
 have the opportunity to satisfy unmet needs in their existing business port-
 folios through acquisitions. Citing the example of a food processor acquiring
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 a food packager, they stated that the complementarity of these two busi-
 nesses could lead to synergy. However, both those authors and Stewart,
 Harris, and Carleton (1984) discovered that firms tended to acquire targets
 with resource allocation similarities, not dissimilarities (cf. MacDonald,
 1985; Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991). Therefore, we concluded that the
 performance effects Harrison and colleagues found were due primarily to the
 bidding process and not resource complementarity.
 In summary, we contend that resource similarities, not differences,
 among the lines of business of diversified firms are likely to lead to higher
 performance. In a sense, this idea conflicts with classic portfolio theory,
 which advocates that a firm's businesses be positioned at different stages of
 the product life cycle, a pattern that implies varying demands for capital and
 R&D. In other words, a strategy that makes sense from a cash flow perspec-
 tive may not lead to effective management of resources.
 Dominant Logic and Resource Allocations
 Mahoney and Pandian contended that "a rich connection among the
 firm's resources, distinctive competencies and mental models or 'dominant
 logic' ... of the managerial team drives the diversification process" (1992:
 365). A firm's dominant logic consists of a knowledge structure and a set of
 management processes that are acquired through the experiences of manag-
 ers during their careers (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Furthermore, these expe-
 riences are influenced by the dominant business of a firm, which Prahalad
 and Bettis called the core business. As those authors explained: "The char-
 acteristics of the core business, often the source of top managers in diversi-
 fied firms, tend to cause managers to define problems in certain ways and
 develop familiarity with and facility in the use of those administrative tools
 that are particularly useful in accomplishing the critical tasks of the core
 business" (1986: 491). According to Prahalad and Bettis, managers consider
 few organizational events as being totally unique or requiring detailed anal-
 ysis. Instead, they process events through preexisting knowledge systems
 known as schemata (Norman, 1976). Schemata represent beliefs, theories,
 and propositions that are developed over time through participation in cer-
 tain firms and businesses. Therefore, managers of different firms within
 strategically similar businesses or industries may have similar schemata as a
 result of their personal experiences in those businesses.
 Prahalad and Bettis (1986) reasoned that differences in the strategic
 characteristics of the businesses in a firm's portfolio can influence the ability
 of top managers to successfully manage the firm. In other words, managers
 may learn to be successful in the core business or in businesses that are
 strategically similar to the core business but may not have the skills neces-
 sary to be successful in businesses with different strategic characteristics.
 Also, Grant explained that the effectiveness with which corporate managers
 of diversified firms allocate resources among businesses and guide and co-
 ordinate business unit strategies "is determined, in part, by the ability of top
 management to apply similar knowledge and systems to the different busi-
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 nesses within the firm (1988: 640). Relatedness based on a common domi-
 nant logic may transcend traditional relatedness boundaries based on prod-
 ucts, markets, or technologies.
 One possible extension of these arguments is that businesses that allo-
 cate strategic resources in similar ways are more likely to share a similar
 dominant logic than those that do not. Prahalad and Bettis recognized the
 link between dominant logic and resource allocations in stating that "a dom-
 inant general management logic is defined as the way in which managers
 conceptualize the business and make critical resource allocation decisions"
 (1986: 490).
 These concepts will now be developed around two strategic resource
 variables, R&D and capital expenditures, both of which have been found to
 be important in strategic management research (Baysinger & Hoskisson,
 1989; Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Franko, 1989; Fryxell, 1990; Harrison
 et al., 1991; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988; Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991).
 R&D Resource Allocations as a Source of Strategic Information
 Resource allocations across business units can be a source of strategic
 information. In particular, similarity in R&D resource allocations across
 lines of business can signal two strategically relevant phenomena: firm in-
 volvement in industries having similar requirements for R&D because they
 are in the same stage in the business life cycle, or an attempt on the part of
 corporate executives to manage lines of business similarly. According to the
 theory of dominant logic developed earlier, these two phenomena are insep-
 arably intertwined; that is, the dominant logic developed in a firm's core
 business is likely to influence both its selection of businesses in which to
 compete (Harrison et al., 1991; Stewart et al., 1984) and the way businesses
 are managed (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986).
 A consistent pattern of high R&D intensity across lines of business,
 regardless of the reason for it, is likely to make skill and knowledge trans-
 ference through executive transfers, promotions, and other means easier and
 more effective. But if one business does not share the corporate emphasis on
 R&D, it likewise may not fit the dominant logic of the corporation. We would
 expect such a lack of fit to reduce the ability of corporate managers to un-
 derstand the outlier business unit and the conditions necessary for its suc-
 cess. The effectiveness of skill and knowledge transference through execu-
 tive transfers and promotions may also be reduced.
 Alternatively, a corporation with a dominant logic that places a low
 emphasis on R&D activities can experience similar difficulties in managing
 a line of business that requires large allocations to R&D to remain competi-
 tive. In this case, corporate executives are unlikely to appreciate the com-
 petitive conditions of the outlier business unit. Likewise, a manager who is
 transferred from a core unit of the firm to the outlier may not have the skills
 necessary to make it a success.
 Independent of the dominant logic arguments is the following: a firm
 that encourages large allocations to R&D across all its businesses may also be
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 trying to develop a distinctive corporate competence in research (Hitt &
 Ireland, 1985, 1986). Stalk, Evans, and Shulman (1992) referred to distinc-
 tive corporate competencies as core capabilities, business processes that are
 critical to success across multiple units (and multiple stages of the value
 chain) within an organization. Because core capabilities are "everywhere
 and nowhere" (Stalk et al., 1992: 62), no one executive or business unit
 controls them.
 The corporate emphasis in an organization that is developing a core
 capability is not on products and markets, but on improving particular busi-
 ness processes to such an extent that they lead to a sustainable competitive
 advantage (Stalk et al., 1992). Hitt and Ireland (1986) argued that even in
 firms that are classified as unrelated-diversified using traditional relatedness
 criteria, there may be some common distinctive competencies that can be
 applied across businesses that will promote higher overall performance in
 the corporation. Therefore, similar R&D resource allocations to different
 lines of business may be associated with an attempt to develop a distinctive
 competence or core capability in this area.
 On the other hand, varying levels of R&D expenditures across lines of
 business may be associated with totally different business-level strategies.
 Scarpello, Boulton, and Hofer (1986) suggested that new product leadership
 first requires a wide range and high level of R&D commitments, then process
 development, and finally, product development. However, an imitator strat-
 egy requires very little or no R&D.
 High or low levels of R&D expenditures may also be associated with
 other organizational factors. For example, highly research-intensive firms
 employ many highly trained professionals and specialists. Professional em-
 ployees desire freedom from bureaucratic rules and authority (Podsakoff,
 Williams, & Todor, 1986). Because of the high levels of training and the rapid
 product and process changes associated with high levels of R&D, an organic
 organizational system is probably appropriate in these types of firms (Burns
 & Stalker, 1961). But firms that place less emphasis on R&D are likely to have
 workers with less training, as well as slower product and process change;
 thus, these firms are likely to be more mechanistic.
 Inconsistent organizational systems-for example, a mix of organic and
 mechanistic systems-among lines of business that are or are not research-
 intensive can make skill transference and proper management difficult.
 Clashing systems can also make physical resource sharing among business
 units very difficult, thus reducing the probability of identifying and exploit-
 ing synergies based on existing tangible resource commonalities.
 Organizational culture is another influence closely related to the or-
 ganic-mechanistic dimension. It is likely that the culture of a highly R&D
 intensive firm will develop differently from the culture of a firm that places
 little emphasis on R&D. Willingness to assume risk, desire for autonomy,
 and decision making are among the cultural factors that are likely to be
 affected, with high R&D firms favoring more risk taking and decentralized
 decision making. Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, and Weber (1992) discov-
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 ered that cultural differences between acquiring firms and their targets were
 associated with low levels of shareholder return when culture was measured
 as, among other things, attitude towards risk, autonomy, and decision mak-
 ing.
 In summary, firms should diversify in directions that are consistent
 with their overall corporate emphases on R&D. The arguments contained
 herein should also extend to corporate performance. Resource allocation
 similarities among lines of business should lead to more successful trans-
 ference of skills, knowledge, and experience and greater understanding of a
 firm's various lines of business by corporate managers. These advantages
 should lead to higher performance in diversified firms. Stated differently,
 low variance in R&D intensity across lines of business should lead to higher
 performance.
 Hypothesis 1: Variance in R&D intensity across the lines
 of business of diversified firms will be inversely related to
 corporate financial performance.
 Some of these arguments also apply to allocations of capital across the
 lines of business of diversified firms.
 Capital Intensity and the Center of Gravity
 Harrison and colleagues (1991) discovered that capital-intensive firms
 sought out other capital-intensive firms as acquisition targets (cf. Montgom-
 ery & Hariharan, 1991). However, the effect, although significant in a corre-
 lational analysis (r = .32, p < .01), was not as strong as it was for R&D
 intensity (r = .64). Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) developed a model that
 is helpful in understanding why businesses with similar capital require-
 ments may also display other strategic similarities.
 The model developed by Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) is based on the
 stages of the manufacturing supply chain, which is similar to the value-
 added industry supply chain found in economics. The upstream supply flow
 moves from raw materials extraction through primary manufacturing to fab-
 rication. The downstream stages include final product manufacturing, dis-
 tribution, and retail sale. According to Galbraith and Kazanjian, a company
 establishes its "center of gravity" by beginning its operations at a particular
 stage of the supply chain in an industry. Once a company is successful (if it
 is successful) in mastering the management techniques and processes that
 are necessary at that stage, strategic changes take place through moves
 around and from this center of gravity.
 Firms that have similar centers of gravity are expected to have similar
 strategic characteristics (Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1986). For example, firms
 that engage in raw materials extraction and primary manufacturing (up-
 stream companies) are expected to be much more capital-intensive than
 companies that produce and market finished goods (downstream compa-
 nies). The capital-intensive upstream companies are characterized by an
 emphasis on commodity products, standardization, maximization of the
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 number of end users of products, low-cost production, line-driven organiza-
 tion structures, process innovation, high emphasis on a capital budget, high
 levels of technological know-how, and a functional emphasis on manufac-
 turing and engineering. Alternatively, the market-oriented downstream com-
 panies are characterized by proprietary products, customization, target mar-
 keting, high margins, line and staff-driven structures, product innovation,
 high emphasis on an advertising budget, high levels of marketing skills, and
 a functional emphasis on product development and marketing (Galbraith &
 Kazanjian, 1986).
 Consequently, similar capital requirements among lines of business may
 indicate a narrow dispersion around the center of gravity, which should
 facilitate effective management and skill and knowledge transference. How-
 ever, even if lines of business with similar capital resource allocations are
 not at the same stage of the supply chain, they are still likely to share some
 strategic characteristics.
 Therefore, lines of business that have similar capital requirements may
 also share other strategic similarities, which should lead to more successful
 transference of skills, knowledge, and experience and more effective corpo-
 rate-level management.
 Hypothesis 2: Variance in capital intensity across the
 lines of business of diversified firms will be inversely re-
 lated to corporate financial performance.
 METHODS
 Data
 Line-of-business data were extracted from the COMPUSTAT data base,
 specifically the line-of-business segment, which includes information for
 the seven-year period 1984-90. Since this study focused on diversified
 firms, companies that were not active in more than one line of business were
 excluded. Data for the performance and control variables were drawn from
 the COMPUSTAT primary, secondary, tertiary, full, and research data bases.
 All variables were averaged over the study period to minimize errors result-
 ing from year-to-year volatility in the measures. Consequently, companies
 that did not report complete data for at least four of the seven years for each
 of the variables were dropped from the study.1
 Complete data were available for 96 firms. These firms participated in
 203 different four-digit and 55 different two-digit SIC industries. Although
 the study group is not particularly large, it compares well with the sizes of
 1 A less restrictive inclusion criterion of three years of complete data for each variable
 resulted in an increase to 133 firms and similar results for the tests of hypotheses. However, the
 less stable measures caused the model error terms to increase, which resulted in a drop in
 significance level for some of the models. For example, the significance level of the primary
 R&D model dropped from p < .0001 to p < .001. Therefore, we had more confidence in the
 results using the more restrictive criterion.
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 the samples used in other, widely cited diversification studies, including
 Bettis (1981, N = 80), Bettis and Hall (1982, N = 80), Montgomery (1982, N
 = 128), and Palepu (1985, N = 30).2 Furthermore, as Table 1 demonstrates,
 the studied firms represent the distribution of industries in the entire line-
 of-business data base fairly well. Studied companies averaged sales of $1.8
 billion, assets of $1.8 billion, and 15,197 employees. Therefore, the results of
 this study are not generalizable to small firms.
 Variables
 To examine Hypotheses 1 and 2, we used the variances of R&D intensity
 and capital intensity across lines of business as measures of the difference or
 dispersion in resource allocations.3 The intensity variables were calculated
 in the traditional manner, by dividing R&D expenditures and capital expen-
 ditures by sales.
 Return on assets (ROA) was the measure of financial performance used
 in this study. Although accounting-based measures of performance are not
 without their faults, several researchers have recently defended them (Bro-
 miley, 1986; Jacobson, 1987; Long & Ravenscraft, 1984). Furthermore, since
 ROA is the most commonly used accounting-based measure of performance
 in the strategic management literature, its use provides comparability with
 many past studies of diversification. To control for industry influences, we
 used a weighted average of the ROA of the dominant four-digit industry of
 each firm, excluding the firm's own financial figures. The dependent vari-
 able was an industry-adjusted measure in which industry ROA was sub-
 tracted from firm ROA prior to analysis (Fowler & Schmidt, 1988; Rumelt,
 1982).
 In addition to industry profitability, four other control variables-
 leverage, relative market share, firm growth, and diversification-were
 added to the analysis. We considered leverage important because firms
 sometimes accomplish diversification through acquisitions that are heavily
 debt financed, and the correspondingly high interest payments can reduce
 profitability levels. We calculated leverage as the ratio of long-term debt to
 total assets. Another common measure of leverage, long-term debt to equity,
 was not as highly correlated with ROA and was therefore judged inferior.
 2 Most small or privately held companies are not required to file Securities and Exchange
 Commission 10-K reports detailing their line-of-business expenditures. Furthermore, of the
 companies that are required to file 10-Ks, most do not report R&D expenditures by line of
 business. Standard & Poor's compiles information directly from 10-Ks and annual reports. An
 exhaustive search of these source documents, which are reproduced on microfiche, would have
 been prohibitively expensive and unlikely to produce a much larger data set. Consequently, we
 concluded that any biases that may have resulted from use of the COMPUSTAT line-of-business
 segment data base were unavoidable (Palepu, 1985).
 3 There was no theoretical reason to believe that variance was superior to other potential
 measures of dispersion. Consequently, in pretests we substituted standard deviation and a
 measure that compared the highest to the lowest intensity and found comparable results.
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 TABLE 1
 Two-Digit Industry Participation of Companies in the Study and in the
 COMPUSTAT Data Base
 Description
 Agriculture: Crops
 Agriculture: Livestock
 Metal mining
 Coal mining
 Oil and gas extraction
 Building construction
 Construction other than building
 Construction: Special contractors
 Food and kindred products
 Textile mill products
 Furniture and fixtures
 Printing and publishing
 Chemicals and allied products
 Petroleum refining
 Rubber and plastics
 Leather and leather products
 Stone, glass, concrete products
 Primary metal industries
 Fabricated metal products
 Machinery, except electrical
 Electrical-electronic machinery
 Transportation equipment
 Measuring-controlling instruments
 Miscellaneous manufacturing
 Motor freight
 Transportation by air
 Transportation services
 Electric, gas, and sanitation
 services
 Wholesale: Durable goods
 Wholesale: Nondurable goods
 Retail: Building materials
 Retail: General merchandise
 Food stores
 Auto dealers and service stations
 Apparel-accessory stores
 Furniture stores
 Eating-drinking places
 Miscellaneous retail
 Credit agencies
 Security-commodity brokers
 Insurance
 Real estate
 Investment offices
 Hotels-lodging places
 Personal services
 Business services
 Lines of
 Business
 2
 1
 1
 1
 8
 1
 2
 1
 4
 2
 1
 3
 18
 3
 1
 1
 1
 4
 9
 18
 15
 8
 16
 5
 1
 1
 1
 3
 12
 10
 4
 12
 9
 1
 6
 1
 6
 11
 2
 1
 2
 9
 7
 5
 1
 10
 Percentage Percentage
 of Sample of Data Base
 0.8 0.3
 0.4 0.2
 0.4 1.7
 0.4 0.6
 3.1 4.9
 0.4 1.2
 0.8 0.5
 0.4 0.5
 1.5 1.9
 0.8 0.8
 0.4 0.7
 1.1 1.4
 6.9 4.8
 1.1 0.7
 0.4 1.7
 0.4 0.3
 0.4 0.9
 1.5 1.8
 3.4 2.6
 6.9 6.8
 5.7 5.9
 3.1 2.2
 6.1 5.3
 1.9 1.3
 0.4 0.8
 0.4 0.5
 0.4 0.4
 1.1
 4.6
 3.8
 1.5
 4.6
 3.4
 0.4
 2.3
 0.4
 2.3
 4.2
 0.8
 0.4
 0.8
 3.4
 2.7
 1.9
 0.4
 3.8
 3.3
 3.6
 2.2
 3.8
 0.8
 0.7
 0.3
 0.5
 0.5
 1.3
 1.5
 1.8
 1.2
 1.7
 2.6
 3.9
 0.6
 0.3
 5.5
 Two-Digit
 SIC Code
 01
 02
 10
 12
 13
 15
 16
 17
 20
 22
 25
 27
 28
 29
 30
 31
 32
 33
 34
 35
 36
 37
 38
 39
 42
 45
 47
 49
 50
 51
 52
 53
 54
 55
 56
 57
 58
 59
 61
 62
 63
 65
 67
 70
 72
 73
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 TABLE 1 (continued)
 Two-Digit Lines of Percentage Percentage
 SIC Code Description Business of Sample of Data Base
 75 Automobile repair services 1 0.4 0.3
 76 Miscellaneous repair services 1 0.4 0.2
 79 Amusement-recreation services 6 2.3 0.9
 80 Health services 2 0.8 1.7
 82 Educational services 1 0.4 0.3
 87 Other services 10 3.8 3.0
 Market power and growth have also been found to be important control
 variables in studies of this type. The data base provided the information
 necessary to calculate a measure of relative market share, defined as the sales
 of a firm in a particular four-digit industry divided by the sales of the largest
 competitor in that industry. We computed relative market share by averaging
 this ratio across all of the lines of business in which a firm participated
 during the study period. Growth was measured as average growth in total
 firm sales across the period.
 Finally, we controlled for firm diversification through the use of entropy
 measures, which were discussed earlier (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu,
 1975). We were interested in discovering whether the main predictor vari-
 ables could explain a significant amount of variance in performance in the
 presence of more traditional diversification measures. The entropy measures
 included three components: unrelated diversification, related diversifica-
 tion, and total diversification, which is the sum of unrelated and related
 diversification. Palepu (1985) provides a detailed description of the compu-
 tational methods involved.
 Statistical Tests
 Analysis of variance using SAS procedure GLM was used to test Hy-
 potheses 1 and 2 (SAS Institute, 1985). We first computed the models with
 the variance measures and three of the control variables, excluding the di-
 versification measures. Each of the three entropy measures was then added
 in turn. We then divided the data set into an early (1984-86) and a late
 (1987-90) period to test the stability of the main effects across the time
 period under study. Only 83 firms were available for use in the early period
 tests because 13 of the 96 firms studied only reported adequate data for
 1987-90. The full group of 96 firms was available for the late period tests.
 All analyses were cross-sectional, with all the variables representing aver-
 ages over the particular period under study (three to seven years, depending
 on the test).
 Tests of the interactions between the variance scores and the entropy
 measures were also conducted to examine the notion that the importance of
 variance in resource allocations varied with the level of traditionally mea-
 sured diversification within the firms. These tests did not add much to our
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 understanding of the relationships being studied.4 Therefore, we do not
 report the interaction test results herein.
 RESULTS
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and indepen-
 dent variables and their correlations. Since all the firms studied were diver-
 sified, at least to the extent that they were involved in more than one line of
 business, the negative average industry-adjusted ROA (- 3.2%) suggests that
 diversified firms, on the average, earn low returns (Chang & Thomas, 1989).
 However, the observed relationship between diversification and profitability
 was not linear, since higher unrelated diversification was associated with
 higher profitability. The negative relationship between related diversifica-
 tion and profitability also suggests that a highly complex and somewhat
 surprising relationship exists between diversification and performance.
 The values for related diversification appeared to be low relative to the
 values for unrelated diversification. Unfortunately, Palepu (1985) did not
 provide descriptive statistics on the firms he studied as a base for compar-
 ison to our data. Consequently, we calculated the diversification measures
 for all companies in the line-of-business data base over the seven years of the
 study. We felt that this procedure offered a reasonable comparison because
 Palepu also used this data base. The data base means (N = 6,970 companies)
 were .176 for unrelated diversification, .012 for related diversification, and
 .188 for total diversification, compared to .600, .027, and .627 for the 96
 firms in our study group. We concluded that the firms we studied were
 significantly more diversified than the firms in the data base but that the
 figures were reasonable given our selection criterion of involvement in more
 than one line of business; the data base includes many single-business com-
 panies. Also, Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland, and Harrison (1991) reported an av-
 erage total diversification score of 1.628 for firms that were actively engaged
 in acquisitions.
 The two variance measures were not significantly correlated, which
 could indicate that the measures assessed different things. Accordingly,
 lines of business that were outliers on one dimension might have fit within
 an overall corporate focus on the other. Furthermore, the only significant
 relationship between the variance measures and the entropy measures was
 demonstrated by a coefficient of -.20 between the variance of R&D inten-
 sity and unrelated diversification.
 Four of the six control variables were significantly correlated with in-
 dustry-adjusted ROA. Of particular interest was a negative and significant
 correlation between industry-adjusted ROA and growth in sales. Further
 analysis revealed a very high mean and standard deviation for growth in
 sales, an indication that some of the firms studied were growing very fast.
 4 The only significant interaction effect was a negative interaction between the variance in
 capital intensity and related diversification for the complete seven-year period. However, this
 effect was not significant in either the early or late time period. Given the instability of the
 effect, we chose not to investigate it further.
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 TABLE 2
 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa
 Variables Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 1. Industry-adjusted ROA - 0.03 0.11
 2. Variance of R&D
 intensity 0.03 0.21 -.41***
 3. Variance of capital
 intensity 0.06 0.33 -.03 -.01
 4. Growth in sales 0.84 3.58 -.27** .13 -.03
 5. Leverage 0.22 0.17 -.13 .11 .01 .10
 6. Relative market share 0.28 0.27 .27** -.16 .02 -.04 -.10
 7. Unrelated diversification 0.60 0.31 .29** -.20* .17 -.22* -.03 .34***
 8. Related diversification 0.03 0.09 -.32** .12 -.05 .03 -.13 .14 -.01
 9. Total diversification 0.63 0.32 .19 -.16 .15 -.21* -.06 .37*** .96*** .28**
 a All values represent averages for the period 1984-90.
 * p < .05
 **p < .01
 *** p < .001
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 Such high rates of growth, whether through acquisitions or internal devel-
 opment, could have resulted in inefficiencies in some firms. In fact, some
 firms may have been sacrificing profits for growth. Also observed were a
 negative and significant relationship between related diversification and
 performance and a positive and significant relationship between unrelated
 diversification and performance.
 Both the primary regression models, models 1 and 2, were found to be
 highly significant in explaining firm performance (Table 3). The results of
 model 1 support the existence of a negative relationship between the vari-
 ance in R&D and industry-adjusted ROA, after growth in sales, leverage, and
 relative market share are controlled. These results remained more or less
 unchanged with each entropy measure introduced (models la-lc).
 The analyses were also conducted with the control variables in the
 absence of the R&D variance measure to assess the incremental R2 attribut-
 able to the variance in R&D intensity. The incremental R2 was .114 (p < .001)
 for the model with no entropy measures, .101 (p < .001) for the model with
 the unrelated entropy measure included, .080 (p < .01) for the model with
 the related entropy measure included, and .111 (p < .001) for the model that
 included the total entropy measure. Consequently, we concluded that the
 variance in R&D intensity across the lines of business of diversified firms
 added a significant amount of explanatory power, even in the presence of the
 control variables. These results offer strong support for Hypothesis 1.
 Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative relationship between variance in cap-
 ital intensity and performance. The results of the second regression model
 failed to support any significant relationship between firm performance and
 variance in capital intensity. Furthermore, these results did not change
 when the entropy measures were added. Therefore, no support was found
 for Hypothesis 2.
 Table 4 gives the results of tests for the effects of period (1984-86 or
 1987-90) on variance in R&D intensity. Not only are the results highly
 significant in both periods, but the R2 values increased in six of the eight
 models over values in the models' seven-year counterparts. The variance in
 R&D intensity coefficients is much larger in the late period, an indication
 that the R&D effect increased in importance. Overall, these results provide
 further support for Hypothesis 1.5 It is also interesting to note that leverage,
 5 We also conducted simple tests to examine causality. To test for forward causality, we
 used variance in R&D intensity during the early period (1984-86) to predict later (1987-90)
 performance (all the control variables were consistent in time frame with the performance
 variable). We also used late-period variance in R&D to predict earlier performance, seeking
 reverse causality. All the models were highly significant (p < .0001), which suggests some
 degree of reciprocal causality-firms do it, it works, so they keep doing it. However, the highest
 R2's were found in the tests of forward causality (.352 for the basic model, .368 for the model
 with the unrelated diversification variable as a control, .425 for the model with related diver-
 sification, and .355 in the model with total diversification). In fact, the individual significance
 levels for the R&D variable increased to p < .0001 in all these models. Therefore, we concluded
 that the predominant causal direction was forward.
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 TABLE 3
 Results of Regression Analysis for Industry-adjusted ROA
 Industry-adjusted ROA
 Independent Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model
 Variables 1 la lb Ic 2 2a 2b 2c
 Intercept -.036 -.060* -.026 -.039 -.042 -.076** -.029 -.052
 Variance of R&D intensity -.186***
 Variance of capital
 intensity
 Growth in sales -.007*
 Leverage - .031
 Relative market share .082*
 Unrelated diversification
 Related diversification
 Total diversification
 F 7.92***
 .259
 4,91 df
 :a
 0
 c
 -.177*** -.158** -.185***
 -.006*
 -.034
 .066
 .046
 - .006*
 -.060
 .103
 -.007*
 -.031
 .080
 -.013 -.023
 -.008* -.007*
 -.049 -.053
 .103* .077
 .069
 -.395***
 6.72*** 10.05***
 .272 .358
 5,90 5,90
 .005
 6.27***
 .258
 5,90
 3.89**
 .146
 4,91
 3.83**
 .175
 5,90
 -.019 -.015 I
 - 07 -.007* -.007*
 -.080 -.049
 .124** .095* z
 a
 -.454*** *
 .019 M,
 7.05*** 3.14* '
 .281 .149
 5,90 5,90
 * p < .05
 ** p < .01
 *** p < .001
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 TABLE 4
 Results of Regression Analysis for Two Periods, R&D Variance Onlya
 Industry-adjusted ROA, 1984-86 Industry-adjusted ROA, 1987-90
 Independent Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model
 Variables 3 3a 3b 3c 4 4a 4b 4c
 Intercept -.021 -.031* -.018 -.017 -.010 -.046 -.001 -.029
 Variance of R&D intensity -.033*** -.032*** -.033*** -.033*** -1,020*** -.960*** -.846*** -1.003***
 Growth in sales -.003* -.003* -.003* -.003* -. -.008 -.008 -007 -.008
 Leverage -.074 - .073 - .084 - .075 -.136* - .137* - .169** -.134*
 Relative market share .062 .056 .074* .064 .067 .052 .084 .058
 Unrelated diversification .018 .067
 Related diversification -.137 -.441**
 Total diversification - .007 .034
 F 9.28*** 7.41*** 8.22*** 7.34*** 8.18*** 7.29*** 9.24*** 6.68***
 R2 .322 .325 .348 .323 .265 .288 .339 .271
 df 4,78 5,77 5,77 5,77 4,91 5,90 5,90 5,90
 a The earlier-period models have fewer observations (N = 83) because 13 of the firms that qualified for the undivided group had complete data
 for only the last four years. All companies (N = 96) are included in the later models.
 p < .05
 **p < .01
 ***p < .001
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 which was not significant in the seven-year tests, became important in the
 tests of the late period, perhaps because of an increase in acquisitions by
 these firms and the increasing use of junk bonds and high interest rates to
 finance such acquisitions.
 DISCUSSION
 The primary purpose of the present study was to relate differences in the
 emphases given to two strategic resources across diversified companies'
 lines of business to overall corporate performance. Results offered support
 for the idea that consistency across businesses in the emphasis given to R&D
 is positively associated with corporate performance. However, there was no
 support for a similar conclusion with regard to capital intensity. Therefore,
 the results were mixed.
 In spite of these mixed results, this study makes an important contri-
 bution to diversification research. In the traditional approach to diversifica-
 tion, firms appear to be little more than repositories for the production
 functions mandated by their lines of business. Accordingly, researchers can
 assess synergy without regard for intraorganizational structures and pro-
 cesses, by using straightforward processes like comparing SIC codes. We
 argued previously that one weakness of this approach is that it overempha-
 sizes strategy formulation and virtually ignores strategy implementation.
 In contrast, in the approach used, we treated each firm as a unique
 configuration of resources with the potential for achieving a sustainable
 competitive advantage. Accordingly, synergy can be assessed by penetrating
 a firm to evaluate the level of consistency arising from processes such as
 resource allocation. This type of consistency may result from, among other
 things, firm involvement in industries that have traditionally been thought
 to be related, but it is not limited to traditional product-market-industry
 boundaries. Furthermore, this more subtle measurement approach taps both
 implementation and execution.
 The theory developed herein suggests that firms that maintain a consis-
 tent R&D strategy across lines of business may be trying to develop a corpo-
 rate distinctive competence that, according to Hitt and Ireland (1985), can
 facilitate effective management of interdependencies among multiple units.
 Consistency may also be a by-product of the dominant logic of an organiza-
 tion (Grant, 1988; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). For example, unit managers who
 have become accustomed to a particular R&D emphasis in their business
 strategies as they are rising through the ranks are likely to continue this R&D
 emphasis when they arrive at the corporate level or are transferred to other
 business units within a corporation.
 Similarity or consistency across business segments with regard to R&D
 intensity could also signal a potential to exploit synergies through econo-
 mies of scope or scale (Panzar & Willig, 1981; Rumelt, 1982; Teece, 1980).
 Resource sharing and skill transference should be easier because of similar-
 ities among the lines of business in their organizational systems (Burns &
 1993  1043
This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Thu, 04 Jun 2020 14:04:01 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Academy of Management Journal
 Stalker, 1961), organizational cultures (Chatterjee et al., 1992), or business-
 level strategies (Fryxell, 1990; Scarpello et al., 1986).
 The results contained herein were not consistent with the findings of
 Harrison and his colleagues (1991), who discovered that differences, not
 similarities, in resource allocations between acquiring and target firms led to
 higher post-merger performance. However, as explained earlier, perfor-
 mance effects associated with the bidding process in acquisitions do not
 necessarily apply to an established portfolio of diversified businesses. For
 example, Barney (1988) suggested that acquiring firms receive above-normal
 returns when private or uniquely valuable synergistic assets are involved.
 Harrison and colleagues argued that "the possibility of uniquely valuable
 synergy is more likely to occur under dissimilar resource allocations rather
 than similar resource allocations (1991: 177)." Therefore, the development
 of a uniquely valuable synergy associated with resource allocation differ-
 ences may occur only with acquisitions, demonstrating that prescriptions
 regarding acquisition behavior may not be generalizable to all diversified
 firms. Method of diversification may be as important as type of diversifica-
 tion, at least in the short term. Inversely, this proposition would certainly
 explain why theory concerning related diversification does not necessarily
 hold for acquisitions (Chatterjee, 1986; Elgers & Clark, 1980).
 Although this study offers strong support for the notion that consistency
 in R&D resource allocations across lines of business is positively related to
 performance, there is no support for the accompanying argument regarding
 capital intensity. A capital intensity-performance relationship might not
 occur because, now more than ever, competition requires quick mobility, the
 ability to enter or leave businesses rapidly as conditions change. Organiza-
 tions making consistently high capital expenditures may reduce their stra-
 tegic flexibility, since capital equipment is much less adaptable to new busi-
 nesses than the knowledge and skills gained through R&D. Alternatively,
 organizations that consistently allocate small amounts of capital to their
 lines of business may find themselves uncompetitive because they lack nec-
 essary technologies.
 Some of the relationships observed in the correlation matrix deserve
 further explanation. For example, unrelated diversification exhibited a
 strong positive relationship with performance, but a strong negative rela-
 tionship was found between related diversification and performance. Fur-
 thermore, as indicated by the very small correlation between related diver-
 sification and unrelated diversification (r = -.01), the firms studied here
 did not demonstrate a pattern of pursuing related and unrelated diversifica-
 tion simultaneously. This fact aids interpretation of the independent effects
 of related and unrelated diversification on performance.
 On the surface, the positive effect of unrelated diversification on per-
 formance was surprising. However, the firms studied here that had high
 levels of unrelated diversification had low levels of variance in R&D inten-
 sity (r = -.20, p < .05). Combining these results created a picture of
 efficient unrelated diversification. That is, although some firms diversified
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 in directions that were outside their traditional product, market, or techno-
 logical boundaries, exhibiting traditional unrelated diversification, they
 could still be efficient by diversifying into areas with similar R&D require-
 ments or by consistently emphasizing or deemphasizing R&D within their
 existing lines of business.
 Hoskisson and Johnson (1992) recently demonstrated that during the
 1980s, restructuring firms were predominantly organizations that originally
 had intermediate levels of diversification. Furthermore, they found that
 most of their restructuring firms were moving away from unrelated diversi-
 fication. Consequently, the unrelated-diversified lines of businesses that
 were left would likely have been those with the most positive performance
 implications. Our findings suggest that higher performance would be ex-
 pected if the remaining businesses shared a similar R&D emphasis.
 The negative relationship between related diversification and perfor-
 mance was also somewhat surprising. However, related diversification was
 not associated with a consistent pattern of R&D allocations across lines of
 business. In fact, the coefficient representing this relationship, although not
 significant (r = .12, p < .23), was in the opposite direction. This was an
 important result because it demonstrated that participation in the same ma-
 jor industry group did not necessarily mean that two businesses shared other
 strategic characteristics.
 Also, we defined lines of business as related only if they were in dif-
 ferent four-digit industries within the same two-digit major group (Jac-
 quemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985). Given this classification system, many
 related-diversified corporations were managing two or more related busi-
 nesses as separate lines of business, as indicated by separate financial re-
 porting. This form of organization may be inferior to combining related
 operations into one line of business. In other words, the negative perfor-
 mance effects might be associated with the way the related-diversified firms
 were structured.
 The Resource-based View of Diversified Firms
 The findings reported herein lend some support to the viability of a
 resource-based approach to the study of diversity (Harrison et al., 1991;
 Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1984). A key issue in determining
 whether a resource can generate profits is whether it is idiosyncratic (Bar-
 ney, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). From a transaction-cost-economics
 perspective, the question is whether the advantages related-diversified firms
 gain can be just as easily obtained by their competitors as they trade goods
 and services in an open market (Teece, 1984; Williamson, 1975). If they
 cannot, a market failure exists.
 We suggest, as have many proponents of the resource-based view, that
 related-diversified firms can create idiosyncratic advantages because some
 of the resources they control, such as experience, are imperfectly indivisible
 (Caves, 1982; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Also, a firm's resource configuration
 may itself be idiosyncratic, in that competitors may not be aware of or able
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 to imitate the configuration, at least in the short term. In fact, the decision
 makers of some firms may not even be aware that their resource configura-
 tions, which may have been prompted by their dominant logics, are provid-
 ing profits (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). Causal ambiguity exists when the
 relationship between the resources a firm controls and the profits they create
 are imperfectly understood (Barney, 1991). Nevertheless, the results con-
 tained herein offer evidence that certain resource configurations do lead to
 higher profits, whether or not firm executives are fully aware of the reasons
 for the phenomenon.
 Suggestions for Future Research
 Future research can overcome some of the weaknesses found in this
 study. For example, in an effort to maintain an adequately sized study group,
 we limited the investigation to R&D and capital resources expenditures,
 which are the only two variables strategically relevant to the theory devel-
 oped here on which firms publicly and routinely report information by line
 of business. However, marketing and advertising expenditures are other key
 resource allocations that may be important in the context of a resource-based
 theory. The use of other methods for gathering data, such as surveys, could
 lead to richer and more comprehensive measures of resource allocations
 among lines of business. Surveys might also help overcome a major weak-
 ness of this study, which is its focus on large, publicly traded firms. A
 question remains as to whether the results reported here are generalizable to
 small or privately held firms.
 Also, the measures of resource configurations used in this study are
 coarse grained. For example, even though we discovered a relationship be-
 tween variance in R&D intensity and performance, it may be more important
 that organizations develop idiosyncratic R&D skills within each of their
 highly research-intensive lines of business. In so doing, they may be able to
 develop tacit skills that are difficult to imitate. In fact, the coarse-grained
 nature of the measures may be another reason that we found no support for
 the capital intensity hypothesis. Future research could delve deeper into the
 specific manner in which resources are deployed as firms attempt to develop
 sustainable competitive advantages.
 Another obvious extension of this research would include other indexes
 of performance, such as measures based on stock values. However, one of the
 key advantages of market measures is their assumption that the market ab-
 sorbs all the strategically relevant information about a firm and adjusts the
 stock price accordingly (Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986). Unfortunately, the mar-
 ket has sometimes been shown to be inaccurate in assessing the future value
 of diversification strategies (Schleifer & Vishny, 1991). In the present study,
 we would not have expected an accurate market assessment of the future
 performance of a corporation to be based on the consistency of the firm's
 allocations to R&D across its lines of business. In other words, causal ambi-
 guity might have led to erroneous conclusions. Nevertheless, it might be
 interesting to see if the market, which represents the collective knowledge of
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 analysts and investors, is able to detect the performance effects of R&D
 consistency across lines of business.
 In addition to these methodological variations on the present study,
 more theoretical and empirical work is needed to clarify the relationships
 that exist between resources, resource configurations, and profits. For ex-
 ample, behavioral and cognitive theory may shed light on the processes and
 stimuli that lead to various levels and types of resource allocations. Also,
 organization theory has the potential to explain the different types of struc-
 tures and systems that are necessary to effectively manage business units
 with various R&D orientations. In addition, transaction cost economics may
 help explain the internal resource allocation processes that lead to various
 resource configurations. Finally, industrial organization economics and
 classical economics can provide important insights concerning the role of
 industry in determining a firm's most desirable resource allocation profile.
 CONCLUSIONS
 Researchers have already recognized a firm's level of R&D intensity as
 an important determinant of strategic competitiveness (e.g., Franko, 1989;
 Hitt, Hoskisson, & Harrison, 1991). Also, according to Hoskisson and Hitt
 (1988), less diversified firms are more research-intensive, and they achieve
 higher returns for their investments in R&D. Our results complement most
 earlier findings on R&D by suggesting that consistency in the R&D emphasis
 of an organization across lines of business is also important to obtaining high
 organizational performance. However, the results contained herein are not
 consistent with the findings of Harrison and his colleagues (1991), which
 implies that theory regarding diversification may not be directly generaliz-
 able to acquisitions, and vice versa.
 Merging the present results with previous findings on R&D suggests that
 a consistently high emphasis on R&D across closely related lines of business
 can provide strategic advantages that are unavailable to diversified firms that
 do not display such consistency. Alternatively, firms that do not emphasize
 R&D in one line of business should consistently maintain this position
 across other lines of business, by, for instance, constraining diversification
 to industries in which high levels of R&D are not essential to success.
 The resource-based measurement approach used in this study was
 found to be a viable method for uncovering one element of strategic consis-
 tency within diversified firms. Other elements may be accessible through
 similar methods, supplemented with surveys and other data.
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